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CASE NOTES
Bankruptcy—Creditor Corporation and Its Wholly Owned Subsidiary
As Separate Petitioning Creditors.—In re Gibraltor Amusements, Ltd.'
—The Wurlitzer Company (Wurlitzer) filed an involuntary petition in bank-
ruptcy against Gibraltor Amusements, Ltd. (Gibraltor)2 The latter's answer
denied that there were fewer than twelve creditors, whereupon Wurlizter was
granted leave to amend its petition, and three other parties were allowed to
file as intervening creditors. 3
 One of these creditors was Wurlitzer Acceptance
Corporation (WAC), Wurlitzer's wholly owned financing subsidiary. After
finding all parties qualified as petitioning creditors, the referee adjudged
Gibraltor a bankrupt. The District Court upheld the referee's findings in all
respects but one—it disqualified one of the intervening creditors on the ground
that its claim was "contingent as to liability." 4 Thus, the number of pe-
titioning creditors was reduced to the statutory minimum of three.
On appeal, the only real question before the court was whether a
creditor corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary could be counted as
separate petitioning creditors under section 59(b) of the Bankruptcy Act.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. HELD: Neither ordinary principles of cor-
porate law, nor the language or policy of the Bankruptcy Act warrant the
disregard of the subsidiary's corporate identity.
In arriving at its decision, the court emphasized the "complete absence
of fraud and strict honoring of the corporate form as to assets and inter-
corporate transactions." 5 It found that the language of the act defining
"creditor"6
 was "virtually all encompassing;" and that the detailed provisions
of section 59(e) 7 indicated that the principal Congressional fear of abuse
was that insolvent debtors might be able to frustrate one or two large credi-
tors by connivance with friendly creditors. Turning to the policy of the act,
the majority referred to the fact that the courts had been quite liberal in
allowing assignees of claims to qualify as petitioners, and noted the absence
of any indication that Wurlitzer had used its subsidiary's corporate form to
subvert the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. 8
1
 291 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1961).
2 Section 59(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 561 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 95(b) (1958), provides that where all the creditors of a person are less than twelve,
one or more creditors may file a petition to have him adjudged a bankrupt; but where his
creditors are twelve or more, § 59(b) expressly requires that three or more creditors join
in the involuntary petition. (Hereinafter citation is to sections of the act only, e.g.,
Bankruptcy Act, §—.)
3 Where only one creditor has filed the petition and the defendant's answer alleges
the existence of twelve or more creditors, the court may allow the petition to be amended
and other parties to join therein so as to make up the requisite number of creditors.
Bankruptcy Act, § 59(d).
4 The Bankruptcy Act, § 59(b) requires that petitioning creditors have "provable
claims liquidated as to amount and not contingent as to liability. . ."
5 291 F.2d at 24-25.
6 " 'Creditor' shall include anyone who owns a debt, demand or claim provable in
a bankruptcy. . . ." Bankruptcy Act, § 1(11). (Emphasis supplied by the court.)
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In a vigorous dissent, Judge Friendly concentrated on the policy ques-
tion. Chastizing the majority for its "bland statement" that the requirement
of three petitioning creditors was a compromise between divergent provisions
of earlier statutes, he rekindled the passion of the Congressional debates
leading to the compromise provision. While conceding that WAC might be
regarded as a separate legal entity in other situations,° Judge Friendly felt
that the obvious purpose of section 59(b) was to require three creditor
interests, separate in reality, not merely in legal form. He concluded that it
was inconsistent with this purpose "to hold that a single creditor corporation
may insure its ability to initiate an involuntary bankruptcy by the simple
expedient of organizing two financing subsidiaries—and seeing to it that
claims against each debtor are parceled out in advance of bankruptcy.""
Judge Friendly has expressed his belief that the recognition granted
WAC by the majority violates the policy of the Bankruptcy Act. This he
has done with a clarity unfortunately lacking in the majority opinion. A
better reasoned and more forceful opinion would perhaps have allayed many
of the fears expressed by the dissenting judge.
In spite of the vehemence which characterized the Congressional de-
bates leading to passage of the Bankruptcy Act in 1898, it would seem that
Judge Friendly has attached a disproportionate weight to policy considera-
tions." He expresses his regret concerning this particular case, but nonethe-
less the purpose of the act compels him to find an absolute prohibition
against counting a parent and its subsidiary as separate petitioning credi-
tors under section 59(b). In arriving at this conclusion, the dissenting judge
would seem to indicate his lack of confidence in those fundamental safeguards
which stem from the fact that bankruptcy proceedings are in the nature of
proceedings in equity; 12 he would seem to look upon the test of "good faith,"
though adequate for other purposes, as not offering a sufficient degree of pro-
tection so far as section 59(b) is concerned.
Apparently, it has never been questioned that an assignee or transferee
of a claim may be counted as a separate petitioning creditor under section
59(b), where the assignment or transfer was for bona fide consideration and
7 As enacted in 1898, § 59(e) provided that in computing the number of creditors
for the purpose of determining how many should join in the petition, relatives and em-
ployees of the bankrupt should not be counted. The section was amended in 1938 to
exclude, in addition, stockholders and directors of a bankrupt corporation, and several
other classes of creditors.
B 291 F.2d at 26.
9 Ibid.
10 291 F.2d at 29 & n. 6.
11 At this point, it might be well to note the admonition of Judge Holt who stated:
"I am not able to see upon what ground courts have the right to impose additional
conditions, not stated in the bankrupt act, upon the right of any creditor having a
provable claim to join in an involuntary petition." In re Hanyan, 180 Fed. 498
(S.D.N.Y. 1910), aff'd without opinion, 181 Fed. 1021 (2d Cir. 1910).
12 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) ; Clark v. Johnson, 245 Fed. 442 (8th
Cir. 1917) ; Ogden v. Gilt Edge Consol. Mines Co., 225 Fed. 723 (8th Cir. 1915).
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not for the sole purpose of making up the requisite number of creditors."
The decided cases do not refer to any absolute prohibition, the inquiry being
whether or not there was any attempt to defeat the carefully prepared scheme
of the Bankruptcy Act. Although expressing his doubt concerning the wis-
dom of In re Bevins,14 Judge Friendly does not seem to be questioning the
results of these cases generally. Yet one might ask why the same policy
considerations, which still retain sufficient vigor to impose an absolute pro-
hibition upon recognition of parent and subsidiary under section 59(b),
have never demanded this result as far as assignees and transferees are con-
cerned." The only difference between these two situations is the "control"
exercised by the parent over the subsidiary, and yet a claim could be
"parceled out" just as easily to a friendly but "separate" corporation, in
advance of bankruptcy, as to a subsidiary corporation. Even if this were
not so, it is submitted that the element of "control" alone should not bring
about a different result in the present case, since Wurlitzer neither abused its
dominant position, nor attempted to use its control to gain any unfair
advantage in the bankruptcy proceedings." The ability of the court to
examine the entire transaction, to search for even the slightest intention
to subvert the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, certainly affords the parties,
especially the debtor, adequate protection, and in so doing, fully satisfies the
most stringent demands of the policy considerations underlying section
59(b) . 17
In a slightly different context, it has been held that a parent may place
a subsidiary in an involuntary bankruptcy," and that a parent may recover
its full claim against a bankrupt subsidiary in reorganization proceedings."
The dissent refers specifically to Comstock v. Group of Investors," and ap-
parently finds no fault with the decision. It notes, however, that the policy
there applicable did not require that parent and subsidiary be regarded as
the same. Whatever may be the "policy" to which Judge Friendly refers,
la Emerine v. Tarault, 219 Fed. 68 (6th Cir. 1915); Stroheim v. Perry & Whitney
Co., 175 Fed. 52 (1st Cir. 1910); In re Tribelhorn, 137 Fed. 3 (2d Cir. 1905) ; In re
Glory Bottling Co., 278 Fed. 625 (E.D.N.Y. 1921), rev'd on other grounds, 283 Fed,
110 (2d Cir. 1922) ; Lowenstein v. Henry McShane Mfg. Co., 130 Fed. 1007 (D. Md.
1904). See also Leighton v. Kentucky, 129 Fed. 737 (1st Cir. 1904).
14 165 Fed. 434 (2d Cir. 1908). Judge Friendly's doubts would seem to be well
founded. The Bevins court went so far as to hold that claims may be purchased in order
to make up the requisite number of petitioning creditors to sustain an involuntary
petition.
15 Supra note 13.
16 291 F.2d at 24-25, 26.
17 The majority of the cases cited at note 13 supra refused to recognize the assignee
or transferee as a separate petitioning creditor under § 59(b). It is also interesting to
note General Order 5(2), 11 U.S.C. following § 53, in this regard. It requires complete
disclosure concerning the assignment or transfer, thereby assisting the court in arriving
at a decision whether to allow the assignee or transferee to petition as a separate creditor.
18 In re H. Hicks & Son, 10 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), aff'd, 82 F.2d 277
(2d Cir. 1936).
10 Comstock v. Group of Investors, 335 U.S. 211 (1948).
20 Ibid.
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Comstock and other like decisions make it even more difficult to accept
the absoluteness of his conclusion in the present case. It seems difficult to
justify a statutory interpretation which would allow a parent to place its
subsidiary in involuntary bankruptcy, and recover its full claim, where the
parent had not abused its dominant position, and which, at the same time,
would not allow a parent and its subsidiary to be counted as separate peti-
tioning creditors, in spite of the fact that there had been a strict honoring of
the corporate form. It is more important, however, to note the approach
taken by the Comstock Court. That Court did not find itself compelled to
lay down a strict prohibition. Its decision is illustrative of the many which
recognize the true nature of bankruptcy proceedings, and establish a standard
in keeping therewith. In Comstock, the Court refused to apply the rule
established in Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electric Co.21 because it found
that the parent had acted in good faith and with due regard for its obligations
to the subsidiary.
Both the majority and the dissent would arrive at a like finding with
regard to Wurlitzer's conduct in the present case, and both would also agree
that there was no attempted subversion of the Bankruptcy Act. 22 In view of
such a finding, which we may assume would withstand even the closest
scrutiny, recognition of parent and subsidiary as separate petitioning creditors
under section 59(b) would not seem to violate the policy of the Bankruptcy
Act. It is difficult to speculate concerning the reaction of Congress to judicial
recognition of a corporate form relatively unknown at that time. Neverthe-
less, behind the clenched fists and the ringing oratory lay one evident pur-
pose, protection of the insolvent debtor I Adherence to the principles outlined
above has afforded the debtor more than adequate protection under other
circumstances,23 while preserving the true character of bankruptcy proceed-
ings. There is no reason to believe that adherence to these same principles
would afford the debtor any Tess protection under the circumstances of the
present case.
RICHARD T. COLMAN
Bankruptcy—Mortgages—Priority of Federal Tax Liens.—Wetbered
v. Alban Tractor Company. 1—In October of 1954, Gaither Inc., the apel-
lant—trustee's bankrupt, purchased certain goods from the appellee, Alban
Tractor Co., on a conditional sale contract. In December of 1954 Gaither
gave the Plaza Corp. a mortgage on some of the goods covered by Alban's
21 306 U.S. 307 (1938). The Court reformulated a general equity principle for appli-
cation to reorganization cases. Known as the "Deep Rock Doctrine," this rule provided
that a claim against a debtor subsidiary would be disallowed or subordinated where the
parent corporation had dominated and controlled the subsidiary, and had breached its
fiduciary duty in the transactions creating the debt, by acting for its own benefit, to the
detriment of the subsidiary.
22 Supra note 16
23 Supra note 17.
1 Wethered v. Alban Tractor Company, 168 A.2d 358 (Md. 1961).
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